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1

Introduction

It is well documented that risk and uncertainty play a significant role in determining economic
choices such as savings (Dohmen et al., 2011; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Lawrance, 1991),
investment in education and health (Dasgupta et al., 2015; Shaw, 1996; Strauss and Thomas,
1998), as well as technology adoption (Liu, 2013; Feder, 1980; Kebede, 1992). However,
it is unclear if risk preferences are immutable throughout an individual’s life. There is
little conclusive evidence on whether and to what extent shocks, including natural disasters,
financial crises, and conflict, impact individual risk preferences. This could have particularly
important consequences for individuals in developing countries given that poorer households
display higher levels of risk aversion, as a result of ineffective institutions, lack of educational
opportunities, poor health, exposure to violence and crime, and other economic challenges
(Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993).
This higher level of risk aversion may lead to under-investment in risky but potentially
rewarding behavior and activities, and therefore have negative economic impacts, and shocks
may compound the consequences of credit constraints and uninsurable risks that exist for
these individuals (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014).1
Given the traumatic nature and devastating human costs of natural disasters, it is plausible that they would impact an individual’s view of risk and uncertainty. However, it is
not immediately clear whether natural disasters would make individuals more risk averse or
more risk tolerant. Indonesia is located on the Pacific Ring of Fire, and is frequently plagued
by a variety of major disaster events including earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions,
wildfires, floods, landslides, tornadoes, etc. Additionally, there is substantial regional heterogeneity of economic and social development, which makes Indonesia an ideal research
setting for exploring the varied ways in which natural disasters may influence risk attitudes.
Using data from Indonesia, I investigate whether the intensity and severity of natural disasters over time impact individual risk attitudes. I combine data on risk attitudes from two
waves of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), a longitudinal household survey, with
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national natural disaster statistics reported by Indonesia’s National Disaster Management
Authority (BNPB) at the district level to assess whether increased mortality and destruction
from disasters changes attitudes toward risk measured by a hypothetical lottery.
Currently, the literature on risk and disasters is not only conflicted on whether natural
disaster shocks change individual risk attitudes, but also the direction of the changes. It is
unclear whether these extreme weather shocks would result in higher or lower levels of risk
aversion, and whether these changes are permanent or transient. The main challenge in this
literature is the lack of available longitudinal data on individual risk preferences, especially
in developing countries, consequently leading to the reliance on cross-sectional data where
individuals are only observed at one point in time. Additionally, most studies focus on
single disaster events, typically some of the most severe disasters in history, rather than the
perpetuation of disasters or the analysis of different types of disasters, which could have
differential impacts. While Hanaoka et al. (2018) are able to use panel data to evaluate the
before and after changes in risk attitudes, they focus on a single event, the largest earthquake
in Japan’s history, in a developed country context. While their results may be valid for the
developed country context, they may not hold true in a developing country such as Indonesia
or for other types of disaster.
This paper contributes to the literature on shocks and risk attitudes in the following
important ways. First, it is the first to use panel data from a developing country to examine
the impact of disasters on risk attitudes, accounting for time-invariant unobservables in
order to address an important source of selection bias. I can therefore make stronger causal
claims between disasters and risk relying on weaker stochastic assumptions compared to the
current literature. Second, the unique aspects of my disaster data allow me to explore the
heterogeneous impacts of disasters on risk. Specifically, I find that the measure of disaster
severity, the type of disaster (earthquake, flood, etc.), and timing of disasters are important
for explaining risk attitudes. The data I use measures the human impact from disaster and
includes the number of deaths, evacuations, houses/facilities destroyed, injuries, number
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of people affected, and economic damages. Third, I am able to look at the longer term
consequences of disasters on risk attitudes, and shows that while the impacts are long-lived,
they are not permanent and individuals do show resilience after 10 years. The results from
this paper can help inform policy surrounding disaster risk reduction as changes in risk
attitudes will likely affect savings, consumption, farming and livestock, as well as other
important economic decisions made at the individual level.
Cameron and Shah (2015), Cassar, Healy, and Kessler (2017), Brown et al. (2018),
and Beine et al. (2020) find that natural disaster shocks increase risk aversion in developing
countries.2 However, all of these studies rely on cross-sectional experiments post-disaster and
assume that the disasters are not correlated with time-invariant and time-varying unobservables, such as residential sorting. In contrast, studies by Hanaoka, Shigeoka, and Watanabe
(2018), Eckel, El-Gamal, and Wilson (2009), Bchir and Willinger (2013), and Page, Savage,
and Torgler (2014) find the opposite result: natural disasters cause individuals to become
more risk tolerant or have no impact on risk preferences. Cameron and Shah (2015) provide
detailed background on why both an increase in risk aversion or an increase in risk tolerance
could be plausible, because of both increased background risk (Guiso and Paiella, 2008) and
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), respectively.
Cross-sectional and single-event studies are unable to capture variation over time and
the heterogeneous impact of different disasters by severity and type. It is unlikely that all
disasters impact individuals in the same way. This paper shows that the results are more
nuanced than a “yes” or “no” answer to whether an individual has experienced a natural
disaster. In fact, both time and severity matter greatly in determining changes in risk
attitudes following disasters. Because the IFLS follows the same individuals over time, I am
able to address concerns about unobserved heterogeneity using individual fixed effects. I find
that individuals become more risk averse as the cumulative district mortality rate and district
destruction from disasters increase. Results indicate that individuals are most affected from
three to nine years following disasters. Individuals are not significantly impacted in the
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short term (one to two years), where despite the higher magnitude on the coefficient, the
results are statistically insignificant. Additionally, while the impact is long-lived, the effect
of disasters on risk fades to zero after about a decade and is no longer significant, with some
evidence of long-run increases in risk tolerance.
I also find that the severity of the disaster matters, and there is evidence of threshold
effects. Below certain thresholds, disasters do not significantly impact risk aversion, while
disasters significantly increase risk aversion above the threshold. I additionally find evidence
that the changes in risk attitude may be driven by specific types of disaster, namely earthquakes (which often result in a high number of deaths and are more unpredictable that other
types of disaster such as floods). Mortality appears to be the most salient of severity measures in its impact on risk attitudes among respondents, and may indicate that the death
toll matters more than destruction or other measures such as evacuations. This is consistent
with the psychology literature linking major natural disasters to psychological impacts such
as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and depression, typically caused or exacerbated by the
traumatic experience of injury and death, specifically the fear of death or death of a loved
one, as well as personal property loss (Briere and Scott, 2015).
This paper adds to the growing literature that attempts to measure the economic and
psychological impacts of natural disasters and how individuals recover from the experience
of a large shock. Governments are increasingly confronted with the challenges that climate
change presents, especially for the most vulnerable populations, which have serious implications for development. Individual changes in risk aversion may inform policy and disaster
recovery programs in a variety of ways, including insurance take-up, the importance of early
warning systems, the willingness of individuals to change jobs or start their own businesses,
invest in agricultural technology, as well as other important household decisions such as
fertility and marriage. The differences in outcomes from a developed versus developing
standpoint may be indicative of the importance of social safety nets and access to credit as
mitigation mechanisms in low-income countries.

5

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, including a
background of disasters in Indonesia. Section 3 describes the empirical specification. Results are discussed in Section 4, and includes the heterogeneous impacts of disaster on risk
attitudes. I investigate pathways in Section 5 and conduct Robustness checks in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes the paper.

2

Data & Background

2.1

IFLS Data

The Indonesian Family Life Survey is a household survey conducted in Indonesia that started
in 1993 and at that time covered individuals in 13 out of the country’s 26 provinces. The
survey was representative of 83% of Indonesia’s population in 1993, and because of the
extensive effort to find and survey individuals that had moved or migrated, the IFLS was able
to re-interview close to 90% of the original households, including split-off households. Since
the initial survey wave in 1993, there have been 5 waves of surveys, the most recent of which
was completed in 2015. The IFLS initially surveyed over 30 thousand individuals from seven
thousand households and to the best of their ability attempted to track these individuals
over all five waves. In wave 4, 13,535 households were contacted and 44,103 individuals were
surveyed. In wave 5, 16,931 households were contacted and 52,568 individuals were surveyed,
as respondents from split-off households are added. The survey includes data on a variety of
socioeconomic and demographic indicators at the individual, household and community levels
including age, ethnicity, religion, migration history, household expenditures, availability of
facilities in the community, etc. This paper primarily uses the individual data from waves
four (2007/8) and five (2014/15) as risk questions were only introduced in wave four.
Beginning in fourth wave of the IFLS, a section on risk and time preferences was added
to the questionnaire. In the risk section, hypothetical lottery choices are presented to all
household members above the age of 15. The respondent is told, “Suppose you are offered
6

two ways to earn some money.” The respondent is then presented a scenario that provides
two options, one where the payoff is certain, and one where the payoffs are uncertain. The
uncertain option includes two possible payoffs with equal probability.3 There were two different sets of questions, one where the return was always positive (Game A) and one where
there were possible zero outcomes or losses (Game B). See Table 1 for the specific scenarios
that were presented to the individuals.4 From the respondent’s decision between the safe
choice (certain payment) versus the risky choice (the gamble between a higher and lower
amount than the certain choice with equal probability), I can estimate the individual’s attitude towrds risk. This analysis will focus on the risk preferences elicited from Game A, as
the majority of respondents fall into the most risk averse category with Game B, and there
may be differing interpretations of results when considering losses.
The responses to these questions put individuals on a risk scale from 1 to 4, where 1
is always choosing the certain option, and 4 is always choosing the gamble (excluding the
Q1 response which is meant to be a logic check). An illustration of how the 1 to 4 scale is
composed is shown in Figure 1.
A total of 17,980 individuals have risk data for both wave 4 and wave 5 of the IFLS.
These individuals form the basis of my analysis as I am able to measure the change in risk
over the two waves.5

2.1.1

Defining Risk Attitudes and Sample Summary Statistics

I use three measures of risk aversion as dependent variables: (1) risk attitude measured on
a scale of 1-4 (least to most risk averse), (2) a dummy variable for being “most risk averse,”
and (3) a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) parameter. For the primary measure of
risk attitude I use the categories displayed in Figure 1. This includes the 4 categories of
risk and a dummy variable for being the “most risk averse” which includes the individuals
that always choose the certain choice. This variable will take a value of 1 if the individual
falls into the category of risk where he/she always chooses the gamble. I evaluate the CRRA
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measure (following much of the experimental economics literature including Cameron and
Shah (2015)) by estimating risk aversion parameters for each individual in the data assuming
CES utility: U (c) =

c1−θ
.
1−θ

By defining utility over winnings from the risk experiment, I am

able to calculate CRRA intervals for the four categories of risk aversion (shown in the CRRA
line in Figure 1).
Table 2 shows summary statistics of the overall sample. On average, individuals fall
between Category 2 and 3 on the four-point scale, and half of the sample falls in the most
risk averse category. About half of the sample is male, the average age is 34 (recall the
minimum age to respond to the risk questions is 15), 71% are married and live in households
with an average of 4 people. Urban residents make up 55% of the sample and the majority
(89%) are Muslim. The two largest ethnicities are Javanese (43%) and Sundanese (12%)
and the average years of schooling is nine years. Average annual household income is $7,678
and the per capita average annual household income is a little over $2,000 (which adjusts
for household size). A little more than a third of the sample that works is self-employed
and close to 75% of the sample are currently working. Migration for work is fairly low at
6%. Additionally, a third of the sample is currently a smoker. Summary statistics by risk
category can be found in Table A.1 in the online appendix, which most importantly shows
that males tend to make riskier lottery choices, consistent with the current literature (Eckel,
El-Gamal, and Wilson (2009)).6
If the risk measures from the IFLS lottery choices are a true representation of risk attitudes, they should be able to predict risky behavior of individuals. Before I examine the
impacts of disasters on risk attitudes, I first validate the measures of risk obtained from the
hypothetical lottery. I use IFLS data on risky behavior and analyze whether this behavior
is correlated with the individual’s risk attitude from the lottery choices. Following Jakiela
and Ozier (2019), Hanaoka, Shigeoka, and Watanabe (2018) and Brown et al. (2019), I use a
probit model to evaluate whether risk choices influence the likelihood of migrating for work,
being self-employed, or smoking.7 Owning your own business and seeking out job oppor-
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tunities away from home are both behaviors that may result in higher returns in the long
run but are risky in the short run, and smoking is generally considered a health risk and as
such we would expect individuals with a higher risk tolerance to be more likely to smoke.
The results of this analysis are shown in Online Appendix Table A.2 and indicate that risk
category based on lottery choices predicts observed risky behaviors.

2.2
2.2.1

Disaster Data
Background on Indonesian Disasters

Sitting on the Pacific Ring of Fire, Indonesia is exposed on many fronts to many types of
disasters. There are earthquake faults throughout the country, and 129 volcanoes lie along
its southern coast. In 2018, the Sulawesi Earthquake was the deadliest disaster globally, and
the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was one of the deadliest disasters in recorded history. The
BNPB, National Indonesian Statistics Agency (BPS) and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
estimate that 97% of Indonesian’s population lives in areas exposed to disasters (Population
Exposed to Natural Hazards, 2015).
Earthquakes (and often the tsunamis that follow) have caused the most deaths overall in
Indonesia, as evidenced by the recent 2018 Sulawesi Earthquake as well as the 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami. Close to 150 million people (62% of the population) live in earthquake
prone areas and this is the highest disaster risk the country faces (Population Exposed to
Natural Hazards, 2015). The most frequent and pervasive type of disaster that the country
experiences are floods, which accounted for 43% of all disasters in Indonesia between 1995
and 2015. Flooding is primarily driven by rains during the monsoon season, but other
factors such as deforestation and development have resulted in excess runoff that has caused
river basins to overflow. While total deaths from flooding remains relatively low, floods
affect the second highest number of people after earthquakes and cause extensive economic
damage. Of the 129 active volcanoes in Indonesia, 70 are currently considered dangerous
and 23 have erupted in the last 20 years, 2 of which are currently erupting as of early 2020.
9

In 2010, Mt. Merapi erupted multiple times and resulted in casualties of 353 people and
left much of the surrounding area (Yogyakarta and Central Java) in ruin. Landslides are
also common in Indonesia, and typically follow other disasters like earthquakes, floods and
volcanic eruptions. Just as Indonesia experiences flooding because of seasonal changes in
rainfall during the wet season, the same is true of droughts during the dry season. Drought
is less pervasive than flooding in Indonesia, but the effects of drought can be severe. The
last major drought occurred in 1997, when lower than expected rainfall was exacerbated
by El Niño, killing over 600 people and affecting close to a million people. One of the less
discussed but severe disasters are wildfires, particularly in the provinces of East Sumatra
and South Kalimantan, where the burning of peat forests becomes uncontrollable and causes
extensive damage and economic costs. Wildfires accounted for the most out of any other type
of disaster in economic damages due to the massive amounts of smoke they create and the
threat these fires have to communities when they are uncontainable (CFE-DMHA Report,
2015).

2.2.2

Historical Disaster Data

In 2007, following the historic 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Indonesian Government
passed legislation to strengthen disaster management and disaster relief in the country,
including Law 24/2007 which established the National Agency for Disaster Management
(BNPB) and called for new disaster risk reduction (DRR) plans for Indonesia. In 2008, the
BNPB created a national natural disaster database called DIBI (Indonesian Disaster Data
and Information) which took over from the National Disaster Management Coordinating
Board (previously established in 1979).
Disaster statistics are reported regionally to the Agency, which verifies the data and
has published it publicly online. The database is organized by each individual disaster and
includes basic information about the disaster including type (earthquake, flood, terrorism),
the date of the disaster, the districts that were affected as well as several measures of the
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severity of the disaster. These severity measures include the number of people who died,
were affected, evacuated, and wounded by the disaster, as well as the number of houses that
were lightly, moderately and severely damaged by the disaster and the number of worship,
health and education facilities that were damaged by the disaster. I focus specifically on
natural disasters as they are plausibly more exogenous than other disasters such as conflict
and epidemics, as the exposure to these types of shocks often depend on human behavior
that might be correlated with risk preference. The dataset starts in 1815, but measurements
and tracking of these numbers have likely gotten more intensive and accurate in recent years,
especially as there has been a heightened focus on DRR by the Indonesian government since
2007.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative number of people killed by disasters between 1998 and
2015 by district (including non-IFLS districts). The distribution of disaster deaths is quite
varied across the country, with a concentration in the densely populated districts of West
Java and fewer disaster fatalities occurring in South Kalimanten. The data is also heavily
skewed. There are frequent disasters that occur on a small scale, killing anywhere from
zero to 10 people and are relatively minor events, such as floods and landslides. On the
other extreme, there are high-impact events, such as earthquakes and tsunamis, that are less
frequent but can kill thousands of people per event. Figure 3 displays a timeline of disaster
events (that apply specifically to the districts that appear in the sample) where the size and
frequency of different types of disasters can be observed. The y-axis plots the four digit
district code and is meant to display the geographic variation of the disasters. The largest
of these events was the 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake that killed thousands of individuals.8
The summary statistics for the disaster variables are shown in Table 3. Disaster deaths
in the district in the past 1 year are low, with an average of less than 2 deaths in the year
preceding the wave 4 and wave 5 interviews. In wave 4, the average deaths in the last 5 years
is driven up by a few larger disasters, the most significant of which was the 2006 Yogyakarta
Earthquake. In wave 5 the deaths in the past 5 years is 9, but again once the Earthquake

11

and other big disasters are captured at the 10 year time frame, the average is driven up
to over 160 deaths. These numbers also reflect the large number of individuals that did
not experience any fatal disasters during these time periods. The other categories follow
a similar pattern. Average houses destroyed by disasters in wave 4 is 136 in the past year
and jumps to over 3 thousand for the past 5, 10 and 15 years. In wave 5, average houses
destroyed in the past year is only 47, then increases to 280 for the 5-year time frame, and
then to over 4,500 at the 10 year time frame and beyond. Average evacuations are close to
7,000 and over 3,000 in the past 1 year at wave 4 and wave 5, respectively. This jumps to
over 50,000 in the 5 year time frame for wave 4 and for wave 5, average evacuations increase
to 12,000 in the past 5 years, 68,000 in the past 10 years, and 73,000 in the past 15 years.
Average damages in the past year are 4.8 million USD in wave 4 and 6.4 million USD in
wave 5. The jump in the past 5 years at wave 4 is again driven by the 2006 Earthquake
and increases slightly in the 10 year time frame to 60.8 million USD. In wave 5, average
damages are driven by a Sumatra earthquake, the 2015 wildfires, and a few severe floods
and average 57.7 million USD. As mentioned, the disaster statistics are very skewed, and
driven by a handful of large disasters that killed many people and caused significant damage.
While there are some districts that did not see any disasters, others dealt with deaths in the
thousands and damages in the billions of dollars.

3

Empirical Specification

As mentioned above, most existing studies show the impact of exposure to disaster on risk
from a cross-sectional perspective. Even when controlling for some demographic characteristics, there may be individual unobservables as well as time effects that are formative to
an individual’s risk preference. For instance, it’s possible that individuals with different risk
preferences are choosing to live in areas that are more or less exposed to natural disasters. A
cross-sectional approach will not capture the fact that more risk averse individuals self-select
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into areas that experience less disasters. If individuals who are more risk averse choose to
live in low-disaster regions, they are less likely to be exposed to disasters. In this case, the
unobserved residential sorting is correlated with both disaster exposure and risk preference,
and comparing risk preferences of those in disaster exposed areas to non-exposed areas may
simply be evaluating preexisting differences between the two groups. Additionally, if risktolerant individuals move to unaffected areas following the disaster, researchers may falsely
conclude that disasters induced an increase in risk aversion, when in fact the disaster simply
induced less risk-averse people to move away and be excluded from the sample. If the comparison group then includes the less risk-averse individuals that moved into the non-affected
area, the average level of risk aversion would be lower, confounding the results.
Due to the panel nature of the IFLS and disaster data, I can follow the same individuals
over time and I can therefore employ an individual fixed effects framework to evaluate the
impact of natural disasters on risk attitudes accounting for the time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. This strengthens the case for drawing causal claims between disasters
and risk, relying on weaker stochastic assumptions compared to the current literature.9
Natural disasters are a plausibly exogenous shock. While there have been substantial
advances in early warning systems and evacuation procedures, experts are still not able to
tell exactly when or where a disaster will hit. Early warning systems in Indonesia were
completed in 2008, so they are fairly new to the country, and are not perfect. For instance,
the system failed in the 2018 Sulawesi earthquake due to destruction of cell phone towers
(people were unable to receive evacuation text alerts), a nonoperational buoy network from
lack of maintenance and vandalism, and lack of observation equipment in the area. Because
of this, residents were not prepared for the earthquake and subsequent tsunami that hit
the shores of Palu. While there are certain areas that are more prone to certain types of
disasters (e.g., close proximity to fault lines and volcanoes, peat forests prone to wildfires,
and flood-prone areas during monsoon), the timing and severity of disasters can’t be known
by the individuals living in these areas. As such, disasters can be treated as a random shock,
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given I control for selection caused by decisions made to live in a particular location.
For comparison purposes, it is useful to look first at the results from the cross-sectional
results from both waves of the IFLS, which is the focus of the current literature in the developing country context. I run separate regressions for waves 4 and 5 of the IFLS using
equation [1] below, controlling for individual demographic characteristics.10 Equation [1] assumes that there is zero correlation between experiencing a disaster and the time-invariant
as well as time-varying unobservables, as the two are indistinguishable in a cross-sectional
model. I then remove individual-specific time-invariant unobservables and IFLS wave characteristics using a fixed effects specification, shown in equation [2]. This specification relies on
weaker stochastic assumptions than equation [1] as it only assumes zero correlation between
the time-varying unobservables and the disaster term.
X

βk Xki + ϵij

(1)

βk Xkit + δi + σt + uijt

(2)

Riskij = α0 + β1 Dj + β2 Xi +

kϵK

Riskijt = α0 + β1 Djt +

X
kϵK

In the specifications above, Riskijt refers to the risk category of individual i, in district
j, at survey wave t. This ranges from 1 (most risk tolerant) to 4 (most risk averse). I
also run additional specifications using a risk averse dummy and the coefficient of relative
risk aversion as the risk preference parameter. Djt is a continuous variable that measures
the cumulative district mortality rates from disasters over 1 to 15 years. I additionally
include other measures to capture disaster severity, including house destroyed and economic
damages. δi and σt represent individual and wave fixed effects, respectively. All standard
errors are clustered at the district level. The main specification in equation [2] shows the
individual impact of an increase in district mortality from disaster on risk attitudes, where
β3 represent the increase (or decrease if negative) in risk aversion category given additional
exposure of 1 death per 1,000 people in the district.
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4

Results

4.1

Intent to Treat Effects of Disasters on Risk Aversion

Results show that individuals who are exposed to increasing district mortality from disasters
become significantly more risk averse for a sustained period of time before the effect fades.
There are multiple ways to measure whether an individual has been exposed to a natural
disaster. For the main measure of severity I use the district mortality rate, similar to
Gennaro, Bhagwat, and Rau (2017), who use the county mortality rate of a variety of
disasters to evaluate their impact on CEO risk behavior.11 Recall that the measure of disaster
used in the main results is cumulative mortality. When individual disasters or years are
evaluated, there is no significant change in risk preferences, likely because individual years
are correlated with each other, or that separately they do not have a large enough impact, and
it is the cumulative effect that matters most. In fact, Beine et al. (2020) find that a second
earthquake in Albania has a cumulative effect on risk aversion, equal in magnitude to the
impact of the first earthquake, showing that experiencing multiple disasters can compound
changes in risk preference.
Table 4 shows the impact of an additional district death per 1,000 people in the district
from disaster on an individual’s risk category (1-4) over multiple time periods.12 At first
glance, there does not seem to be a consistent pattern in how disaster deaths impact risk
attitudes. The table shows that the disaster mortality rate in the past year does not have
a significant impact on risk aversion, the five-year mortality has a positive impact and is
significant at the 1% level, at 10 years is slightly negative and is no longer statistically
significant, and finally that increases in cumulative mortality rates over the past 15 years
appear to make individuals more risk tolerant and is statistically significant.13
The pattern appears more clearly when each coefficient is plotted from three to 15 years,
as seen in Figure 4. The results from one and two years are removed because of their outsized and statistically insignificant coefficient sizes.14 There is a clear pattern that arises
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when looking over the fifteen-year time frame for disasters. An increase in district deaths
measured over a three- to nine-year time frame causes a statistically significant increase in
risk aversion measured by risk category. As time goes on, the effect fades and eventually
reverses direction. The coefficients on the 10+ year measurements for cumulative deaths are
negative. This suggests a strong medium-run impact that fades over the long term back to
an individuals’ baseline risk preference, with some possibility of individuals becoming even
more risk tolerant in the long run (likely due to some resilience that is built over the long
run).
To put the coefficient size into context, the average deaths in the last five years in the
sample was 0.092. When multiplied by the coefficient of 0.085, this impact is small. However,
the impact is large when individuals are exposed to high fatality disasters. The highest level
of district deaths from disaster is 7.45 deaths per 1,000 residents in the district, largely
driven by the 2006 Yogyakarta Earthquake. This would imply an increase in risk aversion of
0.63 (0.085*7.45), which equates to half of a standard deviation increase in risk. Extending
this to a more recent example (admittedly not included in the sample) the 2018 Sulawesi
Earthquake resulted in a mortality rate of 6.36, which equates to a 0.54 increase in risk
category. This is more than double the difference in average risk aversion between men and
women (0.25).
Another way to conceptualize the results is by using alternative measures to risk than
the categorical measure. Results from linear probability models with fixed effects show that
an increase by 1 in the five-year mortality rate makes individuals 3.7% more likely to fall
into the most risk averse category, and 1.8% less likely to be in the least risk averse category.
At the high end of disaster mortality, this results in a 27% increase in the likelihood of being
in the most risk averse category and 15% decrease in the likelihood of being in the least risk
averse category.
Whether I look at the main categorical measure of risk, a dummy for being in the most risk
averse group, a lower bound for the CRRA translation of the risk category, or an alternative
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risk measurement using responses from a second lottery game that includes possible zero or
negative payouts, the pattern remains the same. Only the primary measure of risk preference
shows a significant increase in risk tolerance in the long term, while the other measures are
negative but statistically insignificant.
While it may be hard to measure the direct impacts of an increase in risk aversion in
Indonesia, previous literature suggests that higher risk aversion impacts risk taking behavior.
Dohmen et al. (2011) finds that a one standard deviation in an individual’s willingness to
take risks results in 3% increased participation in the stock market, and 2.4% increase in
self-employment. Jaegar (2010) find that a one standard deviation increase in the willingness
to take risks increases the likelihood of migration by 1.7%, and by 3.1% for individuals who
are relatively more willing to take risks (using an indicator dummy for those who are more
risk tolerant). Additionally, and more appropriate to the developing country context, Liu
(2013) finds that a one standard deviation increase in loss aversion lowers the probability of
adopting new technology by 12%. These results show that even a half a standard deviation
increase risk aversion can have large impacts for those exposed to high-fatality disasters.
There are two potential explanations for the lack of a significant effect in the shorter
term: that there is a threshold of severity that needs to be met in order to have a change
in risk attitude (and the sum of deaths over one year (measured in 2007 and 2015) is not
sufficient for this threshold) or that there is an immediate emotional response to the disaster
which conflicts with the change in risk in the longer term. Eckel, El-Gamal, and Wilson
(2009) find that Katrina evacuees are more risk-loving in the short term than the longer
term and compared to a comparable control sample and that this is explained by negativeemotion variables. Additionally, most of the studies done in this literature focus on large
scale natural disasters (e.g., the Great Japanese Earthquake, Cyclone Evan, the 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami), results of which may be reflective of the severity of these events. It is
possible that immediately following disasters, individuals are either in shock or expect aid
to come, distorting the risk measure. To investigate this, I first re-estimate equation [2] to
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only include disaster deaths for severe disasters as defined by EM-DAT.15 Table 5 shows
that increases in deaths from significant deaths have a positive and significant impact on
risk even in the short run.16 The results for disasters measured over a longer time frame
mirror the direction and significance displayed in the main specification using all disasters.
Figure 5 shows that for severe disasters, the initial increase in risk aversion is higher, and
the subsequent decrease in risk aversion over the longer term is more negative. This would
indicate that individuals who experienced severe disasters 15 years ago are then more risk
tolerant than if they had not experienced the disaster. There is very little evidence on
the long-term impacts of natural disasters, and it is somewhat confounding why individuals
would be less risk averse many years after the disaster occurred. However, Frankenberg,
Sumantri, and Thomas (2020) do find that mortality risks increase 10 years after the 2004
Indian Ocean Tsunami and Gennaro, Bhagwat, and Rau (2017) find that moderate disaster
fatality experiences in childhood lead to riskier decisions by CEOs later in life. It is possible
that individuals face higher mortality risks in the long term following disasters which impacts
their perception of risk and uncertainty, or that making it through the disaster experience
somehow desensitizes individuals to risk in the long-term. This may also point to additional
resilience among the most affected people, where surviving such a serious life shock means
that you are able to bounce back to the point of becoming even more risk tolerant than
before experiencing the disaster.

4.2

Threshold Effects

Using a spline regression, I further test the theory that more fatal and destructive disasters
are more salient to individuals and therefore more likely to change risk attitudes. I investigate
whether the data is kinked, specifically whether a threshold exists, where for individuals who
experience lower levels of district deaths (i.e., less severe disasters) there is a different risk
response than those who experience disaster deaths above a certain threshold. Equation [3]
shows the spline specification, where T is the threshold tested depending on the disaster
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measure (deaths, damages, houses destroyed).17

Riskijt = α0 + α1 Ib [Djt < T ]Djt + α2 Ia [Djt ≥ T ]Djt +

X

αk Xkit + δi + σt + uijt

(3)

kϵK

I find that below the threshold of 7 deaths per one million individuals in the district
there is no significant change in risk preference, and above the threshold, district disaster
mortality has a positive and statistically significant effect on risk aversion, see Table 6. I
also do alternative measures of the spline where economic damages and houses destroyed are
used in place of deaths and a similar threshold effect exists above $114,000 in damages and
above 0.170 houses destroyed (both population adjusted).18 This indicates that individuals
must be hit by a significant enough shock for it to impact their risk preference, small shocks
below a certain threshold may not be salient enough to cause a shift. Interestingly, there
is an increase in risk tolerance below the damages threshold, although the effect is small.19
This result is consistent with Gennaro, Bhagwat, and Rau (2017) who find that CEOs who
experienced disasters that were not hugely negatively consequential were more risk-taking
later in life. It could be true that individuals who experienced disasters but were lucky
enough that their communities did not suffer drastically from an economic standpoint had
a reaction that was in contrast to those who were not so lucky. Additionally, to distinguish
between a frequency and severity effect, I run regressions with disaster counts, which have
a negative and statistically insignificant impact on risk preference (individuals become more
risk tolerant). This further indicates that it is large, infrequent disasters that are driving
the main results. It makes sense that larger, more deadly and destructive disasters would
be more salient to individuals than smaller more frequent disasters as it is likely the shock
and devastation that causes a shift in preferences, rather than constant exposure to smaller
threats that become part of daily life.
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4.3

Heterogeneity: Severity Measurements, Disaster Types, and
Subgroups

So far the main measurement used to evaluate the impact on risk attitudes is deaths from
disaster. There are, however, other measurements of disaster severity that can be used to
explore whether the results are consistent across measurements. Alternative measurements
from the BPS database include evacuations, houses destroyed, and number of people affected.
Additionally, EM-DAT, the international database for disasters, reports both deaths and
damages from disasters for each country. I find that damages and the number of houses
destroyed broadly follow the patterns seen using disaster mortality, but the impacts are not
as large in magnitude and the effects on risk from houses destroyed are quicker to fade. In the
case of damages, the results are not statistically significant, but both deaths and damages
follow a similar pattern over 15 years as the BNPB results (see Figure 6). Evacuations and
the number of people affected seem to have little effect on individual risk attitudes, showing
some short run increases in risk tolerance, but virtually no effect afterward. See the Online
Appendix Section A.4, including Tables A.4-A.6 for more detailed discussion of these results.
From the variety of measurements for disaster and the different subsets of the sample
that are tested, it is clear that the impact of disasters is not homogeneous. Death has a more
significant influence on risk than other measures, such as evacuations and destruction from
disasters. This may indicate that while risk attitudes change following the trauma of the
natural disaster, there is evidence of resilience or a return to the status quo, after a certain
amount of time has passed. There is evidence in the psychological literature that suggests
that those who have longer lasting psychological effects from natural disasters stem from the
traumatic experience of injury and death, specifically the fear of death or death of a loved
one, as well as personal property loss (Briere and Scott, 2015).
Another source of differential impact of disaster on risk attitudes is the type of disaster.
I run analyses on extensive and intensive disasters20 , and also for floods and earthquakes, as
they are the most frequent and deadly disasters, respectively, that Indonesia faces. Larger,
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more intensive disasters affect risk attitudes more than extensive disasters with lower mortality. Earthquakes clearly drive the main results of the paper, and emphasize the narrative
that unexpected, high-mortality events are causing the changes in risk preferences in the
sample. More discussion and detailed results can be found in the Online Appendix Section
A.5, Table A.7.
While many studies document the fact that women are typically more risk averse than
men, the literature is varied on whether risk responses to shocks would differ by gender. As
mentioned above in Section 2.2, Hanaoka, Shigeoka, and Watanabe (2018) find that men
become more risk tolerant following the Earthquake and women are unaffected, while Eckel,
El-Gamal, and Wilson (2009) finds that women are more risk tolerant compared to men
immediately after Hurricane Katrina. Results for both males and females in the IFLS are
consistent with the main results, but the increase in risk aversion is higher for women in the
sample. More interesting are the results by age and gender. Risk aversion of older women
(50+) is not statistically significantly impacted by disasters at any time frame, while there is
a significant and large impact for older men at the 5-year time frame. Additionally, younger
men are significantly impacted in the short-term, with the effect fading more quickly than for
women. Women between the ages of 35-50 are also affected for longer, displaying statistically
significantly higher risk aversion at the 10-year time frame. Again, more discussion and
numerical results can be found in the Online Appendix Section A.6, Tables A.8 and A.9.

5

Pathways

There are three plausible pathways through which disasters can impact risk preference:
emotional response, income loss, and probability updating.
As explored by Hanaoka, Shigeoka, and Watanabe (2018) and Eckel, El-Gamal, and
Wilson (2009), individuals may have an emotional response to disasters, which impact how
they answer the lottery questions. It is likely that severe disasters cause fear, as lives are
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threatened and there is worry about recovery. This fear may result in individuals displaying
higher risk aversion. Additionally, depression and PTSD have been closely linked to the
experience of disaster and these conditions may also impact emotions and perceptions of
risk. The IFLS includes information on mental health. There is a module that asks the
respondents a series of questions about their current emotional state, including if they are
fearful, hopeful, have trouble sleeping, etc. The IFLS instructs that the 10 questions on
mental health and emotions can be indexed into a depression score, where individuals are
considered depressed if they are above a score of 10, which I have standardized for the
sample. Table 7 shows that there is a relationship between natural disaster mortality and
an individual’s mental health and propensity for depression at the 1- and 5-year time frame,
which bolsters the argument that it is through emotions that individual’s display different
risk preferences. The results of the same analysis at the 10- and 15-year time frames are
insignificant, indicating that these feelings are not lasting over the long term.
The second pathway through which disasters are inducing a change in risk aversion
is through income, where disasters cause a loss in wealth and that loss in wealth drives
individuals’ risk preferences. The IFLS also has information on individual and household
income. I run a similar regression as the mental health analysis to investigate whether
risk attitudes are being impacted through the income channel. In this case, individuals may
appear more risk averse because their risk is evaluated at a lower income level. In fact, Table
8 shows that district disaster mortality is generally negatively correlated with household
income (except for the 10-year time frame), and is significant for five-year mortality, when
we see the most significant impacts on risk aversion. Individual income impacts are even more
persistent, with the most significant decline for the 5-year mortality, with highly negative
impacts (significant at the 10% level) persisting even when using 15-year mortality statistics.
This is strong evidence that higher disaster mortality in a district causes loss of income, which
in turn affects an individuals’ risk aversion.
The third possibility, as cited by Cassar, Healy, and Kessler (2017) and Cameron and
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Shah (2015), is that individuals update their expectations of future events occurring once
they are hit by a disaster they did not expect. The likelihood of being struck by an earthquake or tsunami are low, but once an individual has already experienced this, they may
be more inclined to believe it will happen again, thereby adding to the background risk an
individual perceives. This change in expectations may make individuals perceive that the
world is a riskier place because of their experience. Cameron and Shah (2015) do show
some evidence of probability updating, but unfortunately none of the IFLS questions ask
about future probabilities of events or expectations so it would be difficult to test for the
sample. This result is also found by Gibson and Mullins (2020), who find that the decrease
in property values resulting from Hurricane Sandy and updated FEMA maps are driven by
belief-updating regarding flood risk in the area. They emphasize the importance of beliefupdating, especially as climate change is increasing the risk of disaster events.
Belief-updating could have important implications for policy-makers, as the demand for
insurance may increase following disasters and there is evidence that the distribution of
disaster losses may be fat-tailed in nature. Conte and Kelly (submitted) explore the implications of fat-tailed events, where disaster events measured by damages and mortality
may not follow a normal distribution, and tail events may occur with higher frequency than
expected. One property of these events is that the largest observations in the data are poor
predictors for subsequent tail events. The fact that disasters are fat-tailed may be driving
the change in risk perceptions which requires belief updating, since this would be unexpected
if these losses were normally distributed.

6

Robustness

I examine the robustness of my results to a number of concerns. I test for selective attrition,
analyze possible bias from endogenous migration, and compare results to regressions that
include individuals who are “gamble averse.” Additionally, the relationship between risk and
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time preference is discussed in the Online Appendix Section A.8 to validate the results of
changes in individual risk aversion.

6.1

Selective Attrition

There were 28,859 individuals that answered the lottery questions in 2007.21 When interviewers followed up with IFLS households in 2014, there were 7,577 individuals out of the
original 28,859 respondents that did not play the game in wave 5.22 This is due to a variety
of reasons, which I have partial information on. Out of those who were not re-interviewed,
1,561 refused to answer the questions, 1,381 died between waves, 1,089 individuals had a
proxy answering questions for the person (risk and time preference questions were not asked
on behalf of the individual), and the rest were not interviewed for a variety of other reasons.23 This may indicate selective attrition and may confound the main results if individuals
who drop out of the sample have inherently different risk preference or have differential experiences with natural disasters. First, I analyze whether individuals who drop out of the
sample in wave 5 are inherently different from panel individuals in terms of demographics.
The two groups do differ significantly in terms of demographics, and attritors are more likely
to be older (logical as a substantial portion died), female, less educated, unmarried, living
in rural areas, Javanese, and muslim. While this may be some cause for concern, the main
preoccupation is whether these individuals are different in terms of their risk attitudes and
exposure to disasters.
In order to determine whether individuals who attrite are inherently different in terms
of risk preference, I test the null hypothesis that risk attitudes of panel respondents and
attritors are the same at the baseline wave (wave 4, conducted in 2007). I cannot reject
the null hypothesis (p-value=0.51), suggesting that respondents who are not re-interviewed
do not have significantly different risk preferences than those appear in both waves of data.
Additionally, I regress an attrition dummy on risk category in wave 4 and the resulting
coefficient (see Table 9) is not statistically significant, further confirming that differences in
24

risk preference are not driving the probability of attrition.24 It may also be that individuals
that experience natural disasters are more likely to drop out of the sample (due to displacement, death, etc.). To determine whether disasters are correlated with attrition, I regress
an attrition dummy on deaths from disasters in both waves. Table 9 shows that at baseline,
individuals who live in districts with higher disaster deaths (measured in 2007) are not more
likely to drop out of the sample. This is true for disasters measured by deaths over the
last 1, 5, 10 and 15 years. Additionally, those who live in districts that had higher levels of
disaster deaths measured in 2014 are not more likely to drop out of the sample, suggesting
that disasters are not driving attrition (see columns 6-9 in Table 9). The exception is 1-year
mortality measured at wave 5 which is significant at the 10% level, but the relationship is
negative, so those hit by a shock are less likely to attrite and should not bias the main results.

6.2

Endogenous Migration

Selectivity from endogenous migration could be a concern if individuals moved from a district
after being interviewed in 2007 and were not able to be traced in 2014 due to differences in
disaster exposure and/or risk preference. Given the extensive efforts RAND undertakes to
recontact all family members, the portion of individuals not interviewed because they have
moved is low. Further, the small number of individuals that are excluded from the sample
because they moved and were unable to be located are included in the attrition analysis as
attritors. As described in the previous section, attritors do not affect the main results of the
paper. Additionally, the IFLS has data on reasons for migrating, and only 4 respondents
out of the near 2,000 who migrated out of the district answered that they moved due to a
natural disaster, adding evidence that disasters are not driving migration.
Endogenous migration is a greater concern for cross sectional studies where migration
cannot be disentangled from selectivity on risk. For instance, if generally more risk tolerant
people move away from the district after a disaster and only the residents that remained in
the district were interviewed, there would be selection bias in the sample. These concerns are
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largely addressed by following the same people over time and further bolsters the importance
of a longitudinal analysis.
It is possible that the change in risk preferences would induce migration following disasters, where individuals become more risk averse and want to move away from the area after
the disaster hits. If a disaster experience forced an individual to migrate and this in turn
influenced the individual’s risk preference, the impact of disasters on risk could be upward biased by not properly accounting for migration in the identification strategy. However, Table
10 shows that higher disaster mortality has no significant effect or results in less migration
away from the district, addressing the concern that it is migration driving the increase in risk
aversion, not the shock itself. Additionally, I test whether the results differ for those who
have never moved from the district. While coefficient estimates are higher at the five-year
mortality and insignificant for 15-year mortality, the results are largely similar.

6.3

Gamble Averse Respondents

There is a group of individuals that has been only briefly mentioned thus far and I address
them more directly here. There is a substantial portion of the IFLS sample who can be
labeled “gamble averse” based on their answer to the first lottery questions they are asked,
meant as a comprehension check. They are asked to choose between 800,000 rupiahs and a
50-50 chance of receiving 800,000 rupiahs or 1,600,000 rupiahs. If they choose the 800,000
for certain the interviewer asks, “Are you sure? In option 2 you will get at least Rp 800
thousand per month and you may get Rp 1.6 million per month. In option 1 you will always
get Rp 800 thousand per month.” If the respondent sticks with the certain choice, they
are not asked any further questions. This could be indicative of a lack of comprehension,
but it could also indicate an extreme aversion to uncertainty. It may be that individuals
would rather know with certainty the amount they will receive rather than any uncertain
outcome, regardless of the possible amounts. Brown et al. (2019) encounters a similar issue
in the Mexican Family Life Survey and includes these individuals in their “most risk averse”
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category, showing that his results are robust when these individuals are excluded. I remain
unconvinced it would be appropriate to include all of these individuals as a separate risk
category in the main results (say risk category = 5) as it would be hard to tease out those
who did not understand the question versus those who truly are “gamble averse.” I have,
however, included an analysis where I estimate equation [2] using a dummy for “most risk
averse,” including and excluding “gamble averse” individuals. Results from this analysis
appear in Table 11.
The results are consistent across the two groups and are in line with the main specification
where risk category is used as the dependent variable. While results are insignificant in the
short and long run (one and ten years, respectively), additional deaths from disaster in the
district over the last 5 years positively and significantly predicts the likelihood of being in
the “most risk averse” category. The effect is smaller when “gamble averse” individuals are
included, likely because of the dampening effect of those that did not understand the game
or the possibility that “gamble averse” individuals are more likely to remain gamble averse
compared to individuals that fall into other categories and thus provide less variation in
outcomes.

7

Conclusion

Economists have long sought to understand the factors that influence our economic decisionmaking and lifetime earnings. There has been substantial debate over whether risk preferences are immutable throughout one’s life or if experiences can shape these preferences. As
Schildberg-Hörisch (2018) emphasizes, this question can largely be framed as an empirical
one. This paper analyzes the impact of natural disasters on risk preferences in Indonesia, a
country highly exposed to disasters.
As nations build programs and policies around disaster preparedness and risk reduction,
it is important to understand the factors that affect our decision-making following disasters
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and how we recover from these shocks. While the frequency and intensity of disasters across
the world can be variable, the burden of these events is not equally shared. In recent years,
developed countries have made significant strides in reducing the death toll and economic
loss from disaster, while developing countries continue to bear the highest human costs
due to exposure, poor infrastructure and building construction, low household savings, and
the tendency of the poorest populations to live in remote areas where it is hard to receive
aid.25 While the costs of these disasters can be substantial for all countries, extreme weather
events can affect those in developing nations more acutely.26 Natural disasters leave the
most vulnerable populations even more impoverished by increasing food insecurity, water
insecurity, and health risks, as well as causing physical damage, agriculture loss, and income
loss (CRED & USAID, 2016). While physical damage and health impacts are explicit and
have been widely estimated in both a developing and developed context,27 there is much to
be explored in the indirect impacts of natural disasters for those in developing countries,
such as psychological and behavioral effects.
Because disasters can be severe and traumatic events causing death and property loss, it
is plausible that they impact our individual risk preferences. Using longitudinal data from a
household survey and national disaster statistics in Indonesia, I evaluate how disasters impact risk attitudes, removing time-invariant individual heterogeneity by including individual
fixed effects. The literature has produced mixed results on the impact of disasters on risk
preferences due to primarily ex-post disaster analysis and differences between developing and
developed countries.
Because the disaster data I have is extensive, covering multiple disaster severity measurements and disaster types, I can evaluate several aspects of disaster that may be more salient
to individuals than a simple “yes” or “no” question about whether they’ve experienced a
natural disaster. In fact, from the variety of measurements for disaster and the different
subsets of the sample that are tested, it is clear that the impact of disasters is not homogeneous. Larger, more severe disasters affect risk attitudes more than extensive disasters with
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lower mortality. Death and destruction also have a more significant influence on risk than
other measures, such as evacuations or the number of people affected by a disaster. This
may indicate that while risk attitudes change following the trauma of the natural disaster,
there is evidence of resilience or a return to the status quo, after a certain amount of time
has passed. There is evidence in the psychological literature that suggests that those who
have longer lasting psychological effects from natural disasters stem from the traumatic experience of injury and death, specifically the fear of death or death of a loved one, as well
as personal property loss. Intensive disasters which are less frequent and more destructive,
such as earthquakes and tsunamis, drive the results, while extensive disasters, such as floods
and landslides, that are more frequent and less severe have a short term impact but fades
quickly.
I find that women have a higher positive risk response than males, and that younger males
are impacted more heavily in the shorter term while women aged 35-50 are impacted later
and for a longer period of time. Selective attrition, endogenous migration, the inclusion of
“gamble averse” individuals and time preference does not impact my overall results. Overall,
high death toll disasters increase risk aversion in the medium term (three to nine years) before
the impact fades and the risk parameter sees a reversion after 10 years. This indicates that
while disasters are impacting risk preferences, it is not for life, and that after a sufficient
amount of time has passed, individuals are resilient with evidence that they are even more
risk tolerant than if they hadn’t experienced a disaster.
There are three possible pathways through which risk attitudes may be changing: emotional responses, income loss, or updating of future probabilities. I find evidence that both
income loss and emotional responses may be the mechanism through which risk preferences
are changing, but do not have sufficient data to test whether expectations of future events are
changing. These results have important implications for policymakers, as increases in risk
aversion can cause sub-optimal levels of household investment and savings, and may make
individuals less likely to open businesses or adopt new technologies. As climate change and
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population density continue to impact the human cost from disasters, governments should
think about investing in early warning systems (as evacuations do not seem to cause any
change in risk attitude) and other mitigation strategies which can reduce disaster mortality.
Another important consideration for policymakers is the implications for disasters resulting
in extreme levels damages and losses that occur with higher frequency than expected under a
normal distribution, and would have consequences for insurance pricing and how individuals
update their beliefs.
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Figures
Figure 1: Risk aversion scale based on non-incentivized lottery choices
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Figure 2: Cumulative Number of People Killed by Natural Disasters By District
By District, 1998-2015
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Figure 3: Indonesian Natural Disaster Events
Number of people killed by disaster (1990-2015)
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Figure 4: Coefficient Estimates for Risk on Disaster Deaths, all disasters and severe
disasters

Figure Notes: Coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for separate regressions using district deaths
from disaster as primary independent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. All
regressions use individual and wave fixed effects and control for demographic characteristics.
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Figure 5: Coefficient Estimates for Risk on Disaster Deaths, all disasters and severe
disasters

Figure Notes: Coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for separate regressions using district deaths
from severe disaster as primary independent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
All regressions use individual and wave fixed effects and control for demographic characteristics. Severe
disasters are classified as those that have killed 10 or more people or affected more than 100 people.
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Figure 6: Coefficient Estimates for EM-DAT Mortality and Damages on Risk Category

Figure Notes: Coefficient estimates for separate regressions using risk category as the outcome variable.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. All regressions use individual and wave fixed effects and
control for demographic characteristics. Mortality rate is per 1,000 residents in a district, damages are
measured in millions of US dollars and also adjusted for population (per 1,000 residents). EM-DAT reports
statistics at the disaster level, and lists affected districts, not district-specific statistics. Therefore Columns
(1) and (3) show the effect when the total disaster impact is assigned to each affected district, and
Columns (2) and (4) show the effects when the disaster impact is split equally among the affected districts.
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Tables
Table 1: IFLS Lottery Choices
Scenario

Game A
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Game B
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

Option 1
certain choice

Option 2
risky choice
(equal chance of either outcome)

800,000
800,000
800,000
800,000

Rps
Rps
Rps
Rps

800,000
400,000
600,000
200,000

4
4
4
4

Rps
Rps
Rps
Rps

4 million or 2 million Rps.
12 million or 0 Rps.
8 million or 2 million Rps.
16 million or -2 million Rps.

million
million
million
million
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or
or
or
or

1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6

million
million
million
million

Rps.
Rps.
Rps.
Rps.

Table 2: Individual Summary Statistics

Risk Category
Risk Category (alternative)
CRRA (lower bound)
Risk Averse Dummy
Male (=1)
Age
Household Size
Married (=1)
Urban (=1)
Javanese (=1)
Sundanese (=1)
Years of Schooling
Muslim (=1)
Per Capita HH Income (2007 USD)
Individual Income (2007 USD)
Self-Employed (=1)
Working (=1)
Migrated for Work
Smoker

Observations
8,990
8,023
8,990
8,990
8,990
8,990
8,990
8,990
8,990
8,990
8,990
7,947
8,989
8,990
8,990
6,526
8,990
8,990
8,985

Mean
SD
Min
2.84
1.28
1
3.55
0.91
1
1.60
1.34
0.00
0.50
0.50
0
0.51
0.50
0
33.88
12.81
15
4.34
1.92
1
0.71
0.45
0
0.55
0.50
0
0.43
0.49
0
0.12
0.32
0
9.25
4.39
0
0.89
0.31
0
2,006.77 2,459.81 0.00
934.39 2,097.76 0.00
0.36
0.48
0
0.73
0.45
0
0.06
0.23
0
0.33
0.47
0

Max
4
4
2.91
1
1
94
22
1
1
1
1
16
10
46,165.63
19,691.50
1
1
1
1

Notes: All summary statistics measured in 2007, Wave 4 of the IFLS. Observations less than 8,990 indicate
missing values. Income is converted from Indonesian Rupiahs to USD at the average 2007 exchange rate
(9,141 IDR/USD).
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Table 3: Disaster Summary Statistics
Wave 4:
Disasters: Deaths
Past 1 Year
Past 5 Years
Past 10 Years
Past 15 Years
Disasters: Houses Destroyed
Past 1 Year
Past 5 Years
Past 10 Years
Past 15 Years
Disasters: Evacuations
Past 1 Year
Past 5 Years
Past 10 Years
Past 15 Years
Disasters: Damages, millions USD
Past 1 Year
Past 5 Years
Past 10 Years
Past 15 Years
Wave 5:
Disasters: Deaths
Past 1 Year
Past 5 Years
Past 10 Years
Past 15 Years
Disasters: Houses Destroyed
Past 1 Year
Past 5 Years
Past 10 Years
Past 15 Years
Disasters: Evacuations
Past 1 Year
Past 5 Years
Past 10 Years
Past 15 Years
Disasters: Damages, millions USD
Past 1 Year
Past 5 Years
Past 10 Years
Past 15 Years

Mean

SD

Min

Max

1.77
150.69
153.33
155.46

5.18
712.61
712.16
711.95

0
0
0
0

63
4,148
4,149
4,149

136.33
3,432.34
3,810.09
3,778.04

487.19
13,598.25
13,622.36
13,604.19

0
0
0
0

3,590
78,622
78,683
78,683

6,970.60 27,707.96
53,114.09 149,160.65
55,698.28 150,038.55
55,159.56 149,948.37

0
0
0
0

222,180
802,804
802,804
802,804

4.79
57.46
60.84
88.77

22.62
151.62
151.75
187.49

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

161.83
630.00
641.50
1,550.36

Mean

SD

Min

Max

1.46
9.02
167.04
173.19

3.43
17.19
709.60
709.35

0
0
0
0

101
285
4,437
4,437

47.38
280.11
4,561.46
5,266.12

337.86
739.32
14,428.37
14,493.87

0
0
0
0

3,801
8,657
97,927
97,933

3,201.63 15,404.44
12,003.63 34,806.74
68,284.62 162,568.07
73,327.49 164,586.46

0
0
0
0

182,912
305,991
982,859
982,859

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

300.00
1,100.00
1,733.96
1,733.96

6.42
57.68
120.82
125.05

39.15
204.60
260.21
264.83

Notes: Disaster statistics are measured as of interview month for each individual at the district level.
Wave 4 interviews were conducted in 2007-2008 and Wave 5 interviews were conducted in 2014-2015.
Disaster deaths, houses destroyed and evacuations are from the Indonesian database (BNPB) while
damages are from the international database (EMDAT).
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Table 4: Risk Category on Total District Deaths from All Disasters
adjusted for district population (per 1,000)

1-Year Mortality

(1)
3.532
(3.827)

5-Year Mortality

Risk Category
(2)
(3)

0.085***
(0.012)

10-Year Mortality

-0.066
(0.070)

15-Year Mortality
Avg Mortality Rate
Observations
Number of respondents
Adjusted R-squared

(4)

0.002
15,894
7,947
0.0197

0.092
15,894
7,947
0.0210

0.186
15,894
7,947
0.0195

-0.136**
(0.062)
0.190
15,894
7,947
0.0198

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. All
regressions include individual fixed effects, round fixed effects, and demographic controls. Mortality rate is per 1,000 people in district. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Impact of Severe Disasters

1-Year Mortality

Risk Category
(2)
(3)

(1)
8.806***
(1.528)

5-Year Mortality

0.085***
(0.012)

10-Year Mortality

-0.088
(0.062)

15-Year Mortality
Avg Mortality Rate
Number of pidlink
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(4)

0.001
7,947
15,894
0.020

0.085
7,947
15,894
0.021

0.175
7,947
15,894
0.020

-0.159***
(0.058)
0.179
7,947
15,894
0.020

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. All
regressions include individual fixed effects, wave fixed effects, and demographic controls. Severe Disasters defined as 10 or more people dying or
affecting 100 people or more. Mortality rate is per 1,000 people in district.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Spline Regressions

Spline Cutoff:
Below Cutoff
Above Cutoff
Maximum value
Observations
Number of Respondents
Adjusted R-squared

Risk Category
Deaths Damages Houses
(1)
(2)
(3)
=0.007
=0.114
=0.170
-8.833
-1.100**
0.040
(13.12)
(0.454)
(0.446)
0.093*** 0.025** 0.003***
(0.019)
(0.011)
(0.001)
7.5
23.6
345.0
15,894
15,894
15,894
7,947
7,947
7,947
0.021
0.021
0.021

Notes: Spline Cutoffs determined by sample median among those
who experienced any deaths, damages, and houses destroyed, respectively. Deaths measured as deaths per 1,000 residents in district from disasters in last 5 years. Damages measured in millions
of US Dollars from disasters in last 5 years per district, adjusted
for population. Houses Destroyed is measured as the number
of severely damaged houses per 1,000 residents in district in the
last 5 years. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the district level. Spline regressions include both individual
and round fixed effects. Averages are calculated for individuals
who experienced disasters above the threshold. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Impact of Disasters on Mental Health

Standardized Score for Depression
Full Sample Females Males Full Sample Females Males
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
1-Year Mortality
33.05*
47.91* 22.31*
(17.07)
(27.41) (13.28)
5-Year Mortality
0.17***
0.28*** 0.08**
(0.04)
(0.06)
(0.04)
Observations
15,894
7,736
8,158
15,894
7,736
8,158
# Respondents
7,947
3,868
4,079
7,947
3,868
4,079
Mean Mortality
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.092
0.089
0.094
Adjusted R-squared
0.164
0.163
0.166
0.163
0.162
0.166
Notes: Depressed is a standardized score based on 10 mental health questions
asked in the IFLS. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. All
regressions include individual fixed effects, wave dummy, and demographic controls.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Impact of Disasters on Income
Log Household Income
Log Individual Income
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
1-Year Mortality
-2.233
7.484
(1.391)
(9.019)
5-Year Mortality
-0.011*
-0.203***
(0.007)
(0.040)
10-Year Mortality
0.028
-0.312*
(0.074)
(0.185)
15-Year Mortality
-0.013
-0.331*
(0.063)
(0.197)
Observations
15,894 15,894 15,894 15,894
15,894
15,894
15,894 15,894
# respondents
7,947
7,947
7,947
7,947
7,947
7,947
7,947
7,947
Mean Mortality
0.002
0.092
0.186
0.190
0.002
0.092
0.186
0.190
Adjusted R-squared 0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.062
0.062
0.062
0.062
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Log of household income
is annual and per capita; log of individual income is a sum of all annual labor income, nonlabor income, and transfers. All regressions include individual fixed effects, wave dummy, and
demographic controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Selective Attrition
Attrition Dummy

Risk Category (Rd 4 only)
1-Year Mortality
5-Year Mortality
10-Year Mortality

(1)
-0.001
(0.003)

(2)

Round 4
(3)

(4)

2.435
(1.828)

(5)

(6)

Round 5
(7)
(8)

(9)

-2.078*
(1.165)
-0.022
(0.055)

0.002
(0.446)
-0.008
(0.041)

15-Year Mortality

-0.006
(0.015)

-0.025
-0.005
(0.017)
(0.014)
Observations
16,800 28,859 28,859 28,859 28,859
27,552 27,552 27,552 27,552
Adjusted R-squared
0.038
0.031
0.031
0.031
0.031
0.018
0.018
0.018
0.018
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Includes district fixed effects. Attrite is
equal to 1 if someone who had risk data in IFLS 4 is not re-interviewed in IFLS 5. Mortality rate is per 1,000
people in the district and only pertain to disasters for IFLS 5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Effects of Disaster Deaths on Migration

1-Year Mortality
2-Year Mortality
3-Year Mortality

(1)
-0.423
(0.560)

(2)

Migration Dummy
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

(7)

-0.021
(0.135)
-0.004**
(0.002)

4-Year Mortality

-0.003*
(0.002)

5-Year Mortality

-0.003
(0.002)

6-Year Mortality

-0.004**
(0.002)

7-Year Mortality

-0.008*
(0.004)
Observations
15,894 15,894
15,894
15,894 15,894
15,894
15,894
# Respondents
7,947
7,947
7,947
7,947
7,947
7,947
7,947
Adjusted R-squared 0.006
0.008
0.009
0.009
0.011
0.013
0.016
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Mortality rate is
per 1,000 people in the district. All regressions include individual fixed effects, wave
dummy. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Most Risk Averse on Total District Deaths from All Disasters,
with and without Gamble Averse Individuals
adjusted for district population (per 1,000)

1-Year Mortality
5-Year Mortality

(1)
0.789
(1.433)

(2)
0.655
(1.373)

Most Risk Averse Dummy
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

(7)

(8)

0.038*** 0.021***
(0.005)
(0.004)

10-Year Mortality

-0.014
0.026
(0.044) (0.028)

15-Year Mortality

-0.044
-0.006
(0.038) (0.026)
Includes Gamble Averse
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
Avg Mortality Rate
0.002
0.002
0.092
0.084
0.186
0.170
0.190
0.175
Number of respondents
7,947
18,636
7,947
18,636
7,947
18,636
7,947
18,636
Observations
15,894 37,272
15,894
37,272
15,894 37,272 15,894 37,272
Adjusted R-squared
0.035
0.048
0.037
0.048
0.035
0.048
0.035
0.048
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Most Risk Averse = 1 if risk
category = 4. For columns that include “gamble averse”, individuals that are gamble averse are
also included in Most Risk Averse group. All regressions include individual fixed effects, wave fixed
effects.“Gamble averse” individuals answered the certain choice even when choosing the gamble would
provide equal or higher payouts. Mortality rate is per 1,000 people in the district. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Footnotes
1. For example, because of the environments they live in, the poor may be less willing to adopt new technologies
(Liu, 2013), be less entrepreneurial (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Guiso and Paiella, 2008), have short-sighted
views on savings and financial investment (Guiso and Paiella, 2008), and may under-invest in health and
education, thus making it difficult to escape poverty traps.
2. Cameron and Shah (2015) specifically explore whether floods and earthquakes affect risk preferences in
Indonesia and find that individuals living in villages that had experienced a flood or earthquake in the
last 3 years are more risk averse than those who did not.While Cameron and Shah (2015) have studied
the impact of floods and earthquakes on risk preferences in Indonesia, their research solely explores crosssectional differences in risk preferences, and their sample is restricted to interviewing the head of household
in households with children in the rural areas of East Java, which limits their sample to a small geographical
area of the country. Risk attitudes may differ from individuals in other provinces, as well as from non-heads
of household and from people residing in different types of households (i.e., without children).
3. While in other experiments and surveys this question is typically phrased as a gamble between two choices,
due to the substantial Muslim population in Indonesia among whom gambling is prohibited, it is phrased in
a way that the respondent would earn money with the option of becoming “lucky” and earning extra if the
uncertain option is chosen.
4. If individuals choose the certain choice in Q1 they are asked again if they would choose the certain choice
(there is only an upside for choosing the gamble in this scenario). If they continue to choose the certain
choice, despite logic, the respondents are not asked any more questions. It is plausible that these respondents
are so averse to uncertainty that they would choose the certain choice even when it does not make sense.
Following Brown et al. (2019), I consider alternative specifications where these individuals are included as
”gamble averse,” with similar results to the main analysis which exclude these respondents.
5. There are a variety of reasons that individuals do not have data in both waves of the survey, such as dying
between waves, refusing to respond, not being home during the interview, being added to the survey in wave
5, etc. There are also additional individuals who qualify as “gamble averse” in at least one wave and are not
included in the 17,980.
6. For a full review of the literature on gender and risk see Croson and Gneezy (2009).
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7. Only males are included in the probit for migrating for work.
8. The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was the country’s deadliest disaster to date, but the tsunami hit the Banda
Aceh district, which is not included in the IFLS sample.
9. For additional evidence that a fixed effects model is preferred to a random effects model, I use a cluster-robust
Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002) to provide support for using a fixed effects model. The null hypothesis of
the Wald test is rejected, implying that the fixed effects model is preferred (p-value < 0.01).
10. Individual controls include age, gender, ethnicity, religion, marital status, and a dummy for living in an
urban area.
11. While the IFLS has a simple question posed to households about whether they experienced a natural disaster
in the last five years, to which the respondent can answer yes or no, there is virtually no information on
severity and only captures the last 5 years. Additionally, a disaster could mean different things to different
people. In order to avoid possible bias of the self-reported measure of disaster in the IFLS and gain more
detail on disaster severity and exposure, I use national disaster statistics reported at the district level in
Indonesia as my main measure for disaster.
12. See Table A.3 in the appendix for the cross sectional comparison using Equation [1].
13. As the main measure of risk preference is a categorical measure, it may be argued that a linear estimation
is not appropriate. I alternatively estimate Equation [2] using an ordered logit with individual fixed effects.
The results are similar in direction and significance to the main results, however there is more evidence in the
long-term (10+ years) of the effect fading to zero instead of an increase in risk-tolerance. Marginal effects
can only be measured at the average, and results show that an increase in 1 death per 1,000 people in the
district leads to a 3% increased likelihood of falling into the most risk averse category, and a 3% decreased
probability of falling into the least risk averse category. It should be noted that this estimation excludes
those individuals who do not have a change in risk category between rounds.
14. While the coefficients appear large, the one- and two-year mortality rates from disaster are small, and when
this is taken into consideration, the coefficients are in line with the results for other time frames
15. EM-DAT and the Red Cross only consider disasters severe enough to include in their data if at least 10 deaths
or more than 100 people are affected by the disaster. (https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions)
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16. The coefficient on the one-year mortality rate seems impossibly large, but this simply reflects the steep slope
of the regression. Given the one-year mortality rate is below 1, an increase in 1 death per 1,000 residents
would not be possible. The coefficient is better interpreted if you consider an increase of 1 death per 10,000,
which would lead to 0.8 increase in risk category
17. I use the following thresholds: 1 death per 100,000 people in the district, $100,000 in damages, and 20 houses
per 1,000 people in the district. I represents an indicator for whether the disaster measure is below or above
the threshold. Because the district deaths are measured per 1,000 people, the indicator equals 0.01 in the
equation. Most districts have a population between 500,000 and 1 million people so this would equate to
about 5-10 people dying in disasters over the last 5 years.
18. Spline Cutoffs determined by sample median among those who experienced any deaths, damages, and houses
destroyed, respectively.
19. Maximum effect of -1.10*0.114 = -0.125 in risk category compared to the maximum effect above the threshold
of 0.59 (=0.025*23.6).
20. Extensive disasters are higher frequency, typically lower-severity disasters, while intensive disasters are lower
frequency and typically higher in severity
21. This includes 12,059 individuals who are “gamble averse” but does not include approximately 140 individuals
who answered “I don’t know” during the lottery questions in wave 4.
22. An additional 145 are excluded from my final dataset because they answered “I don’t know” when presented
with lottery choices.
23. These include illness and not being home during the time of interview. There are over 2,000 individuals for
whom there is not a clear answer for why they were not re-interviewed in 2014.
24. All attrition regressions include district fixed effects.
25. In 2018, Asia accounted for 80% of the disasters globally, and Indonesia itself accounted for close to half of
the deaths caused by disaster (CRED, USAID, UCLouvain, 2018).
26. See CRED & UNISDR (2018), as well as UNSD (2016).
27. See, for example, Stern (2008); Frankenberg, Thomas, and Laurito (2014); Maccini and Yang (2009); Brando
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and Santo (2015); Datar et al. (2013); Desbureaux and Rodella (2019).
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A

Appendix

A.1

Summary statistics by risk category
Table A.1: Summary Statistics by risk category
Full Sample

Male
Age
Married
Urban
Javanese
Sundanese
Years of Schooling
Muslim
5 Yr Disaster Mortality Rate
Observations

0.46
(0.50)
35.36
(13.54)
0.73
(0.44)
0.51
(0.50)
0.43
(0.49)
0.12
(0.32)
8.28
(4.48)
0.90
(0.30)
0.16
(0.77)
21,137

Risk = 1
Most Risky
0.57
(0.50)
34.73
(12.53)
0.74
(0.44)
0.52
(0.50)
0.36
(0.48)
0.11
(0.32)
9.15
(4.51)
0.90
(0.30)
0.14
(0.71)
2,330

Risk = 2
→
0.51
(0.50)
33.52
(12.92)
0.69
(0.46)
0.56
(0.50)
0.41
(0.49)
0.12
(0.33)
9.32
(4.46)
0.89
(0.31)
0.14
(0.71)
1,259

Risk = 3
0.53
(0.50)
32.33
(12.67)
0.65
(0.48)
0.55
(0.50)
0.44
(0.50)
0.08
(0.27)
9.84
(4.14)
0.88
(0.32)
0.09
(0.50)
922

Risk = 4
Least Risky →
0.47
(0.50)
33.87
(12.91)
0.72
(0.45)
0.57
(0.50)
0.47
(0.50)
0.13
(0.33)
9.16
(4.34)
0.89
(0.31)
0.21
(0.90)
4,479

Risk = GA
Gamble Averse
0.40
(0.49)
36.31
(13.99)
0.75
(0.43)
0.48
(0.50)
0.45
(0.50)
0.11
(0.31)
7.59
(4.40)
0.89
(0.31)
0.15
(0.77)
8,786

Note: Standard Deviation in parentheses. Summary statistics measured in wave 4, and only include those who have risk data in wave
4 and wave 5. Disaster mortality rate is adjusted for district population per 1,000 residents.

A.2

Risk Behavior

Recall that higher risk categories equate to higher risk aversion, so one would expect the
relationship between risk category and risky behavior to be negative. Risk category is in
fact negatively associated with all behaviors, and is most significantly associated with selfemployment. When demographic controls are included, the association is no longer statistically significant for migrating for work or smoking. I also run the probit using a dummy for
being in the least risk averse category (risk category equals 1). Being in this category shows
higher likelihood of engaging in risky behavior, and the results are statistically significant
even when controls are included (except for smoking). This makes sense as those in the least
risk averse category would be the individuals most likely to engage in risky behavior.
57

Table A.2: Likelihood of Risky Behavior Based on Risk Category
Migrated for Work
Self-Employed
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Risk Category
-0.008*** -0.004 -0.022*** -0.014***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.005)
Demographic Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
6,093
3,978
6,526
5,785
Pseudo R Squared
0.002
0.293
0.002
0.117
Least Risk Averse
0.020** 0.017** 0.058***
0.031**
(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.013)
(0.012)
Demographic Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
4,559
3,978
6,526
5,785
Pseudo R Squared
0.003
0.295
0.002
0.116

Smoker
(5)
(6)
-0.023*** -0.002
(0.004)
(0.003)
No
Yes
8,985
7,940
0.002
0.445
0.066***
0.001
(0.012)
(0.008)
No
Yes
8,985
7,940
0.003
0.445

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Results show average
marginal effects of risk aversion on risky behavior from a probit model, controlling for interview
month, sex, age, urban/rural, marital status, ethnicity, and religion, measured at wave 4. Most
risky choice is a dummy for if the respondent is in risk category 1. The migrating for work probits
only includes males. Smokers include people who used to smoke but have since quit. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A.3

Cross-sectional Results

Table 4 highlights the importance of using a fixed effects framework, showing the results
of the cross sectional specification (separate results for IFLS 4 and IFLS 5), as well as the
combined waves using individual and wave fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 follow what much
of the literature currently does, analyzing risk preferences at one point in time, comparing
those who have experienced a disaster versus those who have not, without taking the time
invariant exposure to disaster and other individual unobservables into effect. If individual
unobserved heterogeneity was not an issue, the cross sectional results would not differ from
the results using individual fixed effects. It is clear here that the results differ depending
on which wave of data is being used, and by following individuals over time, I can observe
changes in risk aversion and account for time invariant heterogeneity.28
In wave 4, individuals who were exposed to additional deaths are more risk averse, while
in wave 5 individuals are more risk tolerant given higher levels of mortality, as seen in columns
1 and 2 of Table 4. These results may be driven by the specific timing of disasters during
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Table A.3: Comparison of Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Results

Deaths Past 5 Years
Individual Fixed Effects
Mean Mortality
Observations
Number of respondents
Adjusted R-squared

Only IFLS4
(1)
0.024**
(0.011)
NO
0.172
7,947
0.021

Risk Category
Only IFLS 5 IFLS 4 & IFLS 5
(2)
(3)
-1.249**
0.085***
(0.534)
(0.012)
NO
YES
0.012
0.092
7,947
15894
7,947
0.011
0.020

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Fixed Effects
regressions also include wave fixed effects. All regressions include demographic controls
including sex, age, urban/rural, marital status, ethnicity, and religion. Mean number
of deaths are per 1,000 people in District. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

these two interview rounds, and do not consider differences in exposure that have existed for
many years. Column 3 shows the results when both waves of IFLS data are included and
accounts for individual and time fixed effects, and indicates that individual heterogeneity is
likely a source of bias in the cross sectional approach. The impact of disasters on risk is now
positive and significant at the 1% level. Table 5 shows that when the fixed effects approach
is used, an additional 1 death per 1,000 people in the district in the last 5 years causes an
increase in risk category of 0.085 (individuals become more risk averse).

A.4

Alternative Disaster Measurements

EM-DAT, the international database for disasters, reports deaths economic damages for
disaster events across the globe.29 Accuracy of economic damages from natural disasters
relies on the reporting capabilities of the government and is inconsistent across different
countries. As Indonesia has focused efforts on disaster management since the 2004 Tsunami,
damages are likely more accurate than other developing countries. However, EM-DAT data
reports the damages from each disaster event and lists affected districts, but does not report
damages per district (i.e., the statistics are less geographically accurate) and may be less
reliable than the BPNB database.30 I run the analysis in two ways: (1) each district listed is
59

assigned the full impact of the disaster event (inherently an overestimation), and (2) assuming
each district affected equally, and dividing the damages among the affected districts.
When I run equation [2] using the deaths from EM-DAT instead of the BNPB, the results
hold in sign and generally in statistical significance, although the coefficients are smaller,
likely due to the measurement error associated with the disaster locations. The results of
the EM-DAT regressions can be found in Table A.4. When I use economic damages as the
Djt measure, damages (population adjusted) have no significant impact and the coefficient
is relatively small. Results are statistically significant at the 10% level for the five-year
time frame, and then fades at the 10 year time frame.31 These results are notable for two
reasons. First, results from the EM-DAT analysis are consistent with the findings using the
BPNB data, showing that the main results hold regardless of which database for disasters is
used. Second, these results show that disaster mortality is more salient to individuals than
economic damages, indicating the possibility of risk preference changes induced by highmortality, rather than financial costs of disaster. This may perhaps be due to a psychological
component of high-mortality events that are traumatic enough to change an individual’s
underlying attitude toward risk.
Additionally, the BNPB also reports other measures of disaster, including houses destroyed and evacuations, and I use these as alternative disaster severity measurements, see
Tables 8 and 9. For houses destroyed, results for the 5 year time frame are similar in sign
and significance, and while the coefficients are smaller in magnitude, this is because the
number of houses destroyed in a disaster is typically higher than the mortality rate. When
this is taken into account, the results closely mirror the main results. Houses destroyed in
the district in the past year, however, has a negative impact on risk attitudes. This could
be because there is a different psychological response in the short run causing people to
become more risk loving when there is physical damage rather than human costs, or that in
the short term the community support, temporary housing, or aid received counteracts the
impact on risk aversion. Because the BNBP only started tracking houses destroyed in 1999,
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Table A.4: EMDAT Data: Deaths and Damages Effect on Risk Category

1 Year
District Mean
District Max
5 Years
District Mean
District Max
10 Years
District Mean
District Max
15 Years
District Mean
District Max

Mortality Rate
Total
Split
(1)
(2)
0.200
0.935
(0.147) (0.144)
0.02
0.001
1.97
0.16

Damages
Total
Split
(3)
(4)
0.010
0.187
(0.011) (0.180)
0.11
0.01
20.20
1.22

0.013*
(0.007)
0.66
19.49

0.131*
(0.067)
0.07
2.73

0.016
(0.011)
0.51
23.57

0.105
(0.105)
0.06
1.56

0.002
(0.008)
1.55
100.53

0.033
(0.098)
0.15
10.23

-0.003
(0.006)
1.34
53.31

-0.035
(0.113)
0.12
5.28

0.000
(0.010)
1.61
100.53

-0.040
(0.118)
0.16
10.23

-0.001
(0.001)
2.74
174.48

-0.058
(0.045)
0.17
5.85

Notes: N=15,894 (7,947 IFLS respondents). Robust standard errors
in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Each coefficient shown
in table is from a separate regression with individual and wave fixed
effects. Mortality rate is per 1,000 residents in a district, damages are
measured in millions of US dollars and also adjusted for population
(per 1,000 residents). EM-DAT reports statistics at the disaster level,
and lists affected districts, not district-specific statistics. Therefore
Columns (1) and (3) show the effect when the total disaster impact is
assigned to each affected district, and Columns (2) and (4) show the
effects when the disaster impact is split equally among the affected
districts. District mean and max shows the average and maximum,
respectively, for each time frame and disaster measurement to give
context for the coefficient magnitude. Number of observations, respondents, and the adjusted R-squared are the same for every regression in
each column. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

61

Table A.5: Risk Category on Total Houses Destroyed in District from All Disasters
adjusted for district population (per 1,000)

Houses Destroyed Past 1
Houses Destroyed Past 5
Houses Destroyed Past 9
Mean # Houses
Number of respondents
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Risk Category
(1)
(2)
(3)
Year -0.118***
(0.031)
Years
0.003***
(0.001)
Years
0.001
(0.001)
0.13
2.37
4.45
7,947
7,947
7,947
15,894
15,894
15,894
0.023
0.020
0.020

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. All
regressions include individual fixed effects, wave fixed effects. Mean number
of houses destroyed are per 1,000 people in district. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1

I am only able to show results for houses destroyed up to 9 years, but a similar pattern to
mortality appears over the 7-9 year time period, suggesting the effect fades faster than when
measuring mortality.
Evacuations also negatively impact risk attitudes after 1 year but have a smaller impact
than destroyed houses and is only significant at the 10% level. Generally, when looking over
time frames longer than one year, evacuations do not influence risk attitudes significantly.
When evacuations are higher, or early warning systems work to evacuate people earlier, death
may be avoided. Therefore, results indicate that being displaced to avoid disaster means
that the disaster does not significantly impact risk attitudes. This may have implications for
policy as it may be worth investing in technology that will allow governments to evacuate
residents earlier and more efficiently to avoid disaster mortality.
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Table A.6: Risk Category on Total Evacuations in District from All Disasters
adjusted for district population (per 1,000)

Evacuation Past 1 Year

(1)
-0.003*
(0.002)

Evacuation Past 5 Years

Risk Category
(2)
(3)

0.0002
(0.0002)

Evacuation Past 10 Years

-0.0003
(0.0004)

Evacuation Past 15 Years
Mean # Evacuations
Number of respondents
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(4)

4.0
7,947
15,894
0.02

35.1
7,947
15,894
0.02

67.8
7,947
15,894
0.02

-0.0001
(0.0003)
70.7
7,947
15,894
0.02

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. All regressions include individual fixed effects, wave fixed effects. Mean Evacuations are
per 1,000 people in district. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A.5

Disaster Type

The type of damage and death toll often depends on whether the disaster is intensive or
extensive. Extensive disasters are higher frequency, low-severity disasters such as floods,
landslides, wildfire, etc. Intensive disasters are lower frequency and high-severity disasters
including earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, etc. Floods are the most common
extensive disaster in Indonesia, while earthquakes are the most common and deadly intensive
disaster. Results using
Another source of differential impact of disaster on risk attitudes is the type of disaster.
The type of damage and death toll often depends on whether the disaster is intensive or
extensive. Extensive disasters are higher frequency, low-severity disasters such as floods,
landslides, wildfire, etc. Intensive disasters are lower frequency and high-severity disasters
including earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, etc. Floods are the most common
extensive disaster in Indonesia, while earthquakes are the most common and deadly intensive
disaster. When equation [2] uses floods and earthquake deaths as the Djt measure, the results
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contrast each other. Table 10 shows that individuals become more risk averse following
additional exposure to deaths from flooding, but these results disappear when looking at
longer time frames. Conversely, results from the earthquake regression are consistent with
the main results. There are no significant impacts at 1 and 10 years, but a statistically
significant increase in risk aversion from increased earthquake deaths over the last 5 years.32
Table A.7: Risk Category on Total District Deaths from Floods vs. Earthquakes
adjusted for district population (per 1,000)
Risk Category

1-Year Mortality

(1)
6.141**
(3.059)

5-Year Mortality

Floods
(2)
(3)

(5)
-26.970
(23.010)

3.526
(2.363)

10-Year Mortality

Earthquakes
(6)
(7)

0.365
(1.217)

0.001
7,947
15,894
0.021

0.004
7,947
15,894
0.021

(8)

0.084***
(0.012)

15-Year Mortality
Avg Mortality Rate
# respondents
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(4)

0.007
7,947
15,894
0.020

-0.095*
(0.056)
0.276
(1.261)
0.009
7,947
15,894
0.020

0.0002
7,947
15,894
0.021

0.079
7,947
15,894
0.021

0.162
7,947
15,894
0.020

-0.142**
(0.058)
0.162
7,947
15,894
0.020

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. All regressions include individual fixed effects,
wave fixed effects. Mortality rate is per 1,000 people in district. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A.6

Results by Gender & Age

I next examine heterogeneity of the impact on risk preferences by gender and age within
the sample. Table 11 shows that when equation [2] is estimated separately for women and
men, the results generally hold for both. The results at the one- and 10-year time frame are
insignificant. The coefficient on deaths from disasters in the district over the last five years is
positive and statistically significant for both genders, but the coefficient is larger for women
than men (0.092 for women vs. 0.067 for men).33 This differs from Hanaoka, Shigeoka, and
Watanabe (2018) who find significant gender differences in their results. I also find that
women, especially those in households with children, have a higher positive risk response
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than males. Additionally, the inclusion of “gamble averse” individuals does not impact my
overall results.
Table A.8: By Gender: Risk Category on Total District Deaths from Disasters
adjusted for district population (per 1,000)
Risk Category

1-Year Mortality

(1)
5.475
(3.658)

5-Year Mortality

Males
(2)
(3)

(4)

0.079***
(0.011)

10-Year Mortality

(6)

Females
(7)

-0.115
(0.091)

0.002
4,559
8,158
0.026

0.094
4,559
8,158
0.027

(8)

0.092***
(0.016)

15-Year Mortality
Avg Mortality Rate
Number of respondents
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(5)
0.995
(5.671)

0.083
(0.097)
-0.129
(0.094)
0.197
4,079
8,158
0.026

0.192
4,559
8,158
0.026

0.002
3,868
7,736
0.016

0.089
3,868
7,736
0.018

0.180
3,868
7,736
0.016

-0.124
(0.165)
0.184
3,868
7,736
0.016

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. All regressions include individual fixed effects, wave
fixed effects. Mortality rate is per 1,000 people in district. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

More interesting than the slight overall differences between men and women is the difference among age groups by gender, as shown in Table 12. Frankenberg, Sumantri, and
Thomas (2020) examine the impact of the 2004 Tsunami on mortality risk in the long run.
They look at how community mortality rates from the tsunami influence the community
mortality rate 5 and 10 years after the tsunami struck. They find that mortality risk varies
among genders and different age groups and while overall there is evidence of positive mortality selection, after 10 years they find that older men have higher mortality risk due to
scarring. Following the age groupings in Frankenberg, Sumantri, and Thomas (2020), I look
at men and women who are under 35, between 35 and 50, and over 50 years old.
Results are presented in Table 12. While increased mortality causes increased risk aversion in the five-year time frame for both genders and most age groups, surprising patterns
appear. Younger men are affected in the short term, becoming more risk averse one to five
years after experiencing a disaster and the effect fades after five years, while women aged
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Table A.9: Heterogeneous Effects - Coefficient Estimates By Age & Gender
Risk Category
35-50
50+
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
1-Year Mortality
-0.576
12.710***
0.571
-0.704
4.270
1.711
(6.215)
(4.814)
(8.460) (4.328)
(8.542)
(8.697)
5-Year Mortality
0.095*** 0.087***
0.126*** 0.034**
0.003
0.169***
(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.035) (0.015)
(0.026)
(0.035)
10-Year Mortality
-0.042
-0.109
0.343**
-0.139
-0.653
-0.449
(0.118)
(0.079)
(0.168) (0.194)
(0.745)
(0.576)
15-Year Mortality
-0.185
-0.123
0.028
-0.126
-0.842
-0.564
(0.133)
(0.092)
(0.270) (0.167)
(0.672)
(0.479)
Observations
4,494
4,446
2,212
2,600
1,030
1,112
Number of respondents
2,247
2,223
1,106
1,300
515
556
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates for separate regressions of disasters deaths on risk
category. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. All regressions
include individual fixed effects, wave dummy, and demographic controls. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
<35

35-50 have a later onset affect, becoming more risk averse five to ten years after the disaster,
but not in the short term nor at the fifteen-year time frame. Additionally, the largest impact
appears for men over 50 years old at the five-year time frame, with coefficient sizes double
that of the overall results. This could be indicative of the income channel, where men above
50 are less able to smooth consumption over their lifetimes.

A.7

Disasters as Fat-tailed Events

Conte and Kelly (submitted) explore the implications of disasters being fat-tailed events,
where damages and mortality may not follow a normal distribution, and tail events may
occur with higher frequency than expected. One property of these events is that the largest
observations in the data are poor predictors for subsequent tail events. The fact that disasters
are fat-tailed may be driving the change in risk perceptions which requires belief updating,
since this would be unexpected if these losses were normally distributed. See the Online
Appendix Section A.7 for more discussion on fat-tailed events. While Conte and Kelly (sub66

mitted) focuses on climate change specifically, they do also speculate on the implications for
disaster management. They point out that large disaster events decrease property values in
affected communities, cause an uptick in insurance policy purchases after major flooding,
and can have important bankruptcy risk consequences as there may be an underestimation
of damage from catastrophic events. Under such circumstances, tail event occurrences may
increase the reserve requirements and could in turn increase insurance rates to cover the
increase. This is exacerbated by some findings that these events likely have non-stationary
distributions due to climate change (Coronese et al., 2019). Additionally, these events are
unlikely to impact the population uniformly, and maybe affect low-income property owners
who are less likely to be insured more than wealthier individuals. Policy makers must think
about the welfare cost associated with tail events that cause large damages and high mortality, and are likely to impact those residents with lower wealth. For some suggestive evidence
that disaster mortality and damages are likely fat-tailed events that require particular policy
attention, see Figure 7 which shows Quantile-Quantile Plots.34 This is especially important
during a time when Indonesia is engaging the World Bank on disaster risk financing and
insurance programs, as well as implementing Rice Farming Insurance programs to protect
rice farmers in the face of increased flooding, typhoons, and other disasters. As can be seen
in the figure, for both damages and deaths caused by disasters, the right tail lies above the
normal distribution and log-normal distributions (the modeling used by the World Bank
to determine estimates for future losses and the requirements for future public spending),
indicating that disaster are fat-tailed events. While outside the scope of this paper, it would
be beneficial to understand how alternative policies would be affected by fat-tailed events,
especially as it pertains to belief updating and insurance pricing.

A.8

Time Preference

Risk preferences are closely tied to time preferences, or the amount of patience an individual
displays. Several studies have found that there is a negative relationship between time and
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Figure A.1: Quantile-Quantile Plots for Disaster Mortality and Damages

Figure Notes: The first row shows the Q-Q normal distribution plots for Deaths (left) and Damages (right)
for all disaster events in Indonesia (excluding the 2004 Tsunami as this is an extreme outlier). The second
row shows the same as row one, except now comparing to a log-normal distribtion (used in loss modeling
by the World Bank for the Indonesian Goverment). This shows the possible underestimation of losses and
mortality for extreme disaster events.

68

risk preferences. One way to corroborate the main results on risk preferences is examining
the impact of disasters on time preferences. In additions to the risk preference questions, the
IFLS also includes questions on time preference. The questions follow a similar structure to
the games in the risk preference section, except individuals are given the option between an
amount today or another amount one or five years from now. The specific questions can be
found below in Table 18.
Table A.10: IFLS Time Preferences
Scenario

Option 1
Money Today

Option 2
Money Later

Game A
Q1
1 million Rps Today
Q2
1 million Rps Today
Q3
1 million Rps Today
Q4
1 million Rps Today
Game B
Q1
1 million Rps Today
Q2
1 million Rps Today
Q3
1 million Rps Today
Q4
1 million Rps Today

or
or
or
or

500,000 Rps. in 5 years
4 million Rps. in 5 years
10 million Rps. in 5 years
2 million Rps. in 5 years

or
or
or
or

1
3
6
2

million
million
million
million

Rps.
Rps.
Rps.
Rps.

in
in
in
in

1
1
1
1

year
year
year
year

The results show a similar pattern to risk preference, but in the opposite direction. One
might expect that if disasters are making people more risk averse, they would also make
individuals more impatient due to the increase in uncertainty and weighing the present more
heavily. However, I find that individuals are much more patient in the short run (deaths
measured over the past year), are mildly more patient when analyzing disasters over three to
nine years and in the longer term (10+ years) are more impatient, again suggesting a reversion
back to the original time preference (although the long term results are insignificant). These
results are summarized in Table 22 and Figure 8. The table shows the numerical results
looking at snapshots for disasters measured over 1, 5, 10, and 15 years, while the figure
shows coefficient estimates for each year. Individuals may become more patient because
after experiencing a disaster they understand the importance of saving for future negative

69

shocks, or they may be receiving aid in the short term, making the choice to receive a higher
amount of money later more attractive (when aid runs out).
Figure A.2: Coefficient Estimates for Time on Disaster Deaths, all disasters and severe
disasters
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Table A.11: Time Preference Category on Total District Deaths from All Disasters
adjusted for district population (per 1,000)

1-Year Mortality

Time Category
(2)
(3)

(1)
-5.521**
(2.493)

5-Year Mortality

-0.0218***
(0.006)

10-Year Mortality

0.083
(0.063)

15-Year Mortality
Avg Mortality Rate
Number of pidlink
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(4)

0.002
17,825
35,650
0.00583

0.084
17,825
35,650
0.00493

0.171
17,825
35,650
0.00493

0.0487
(0.059)
0.175
17,825
35,650
0.00482

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. All
regressions include individual fixed effects, wave fixed effects, and demographic controls. Mortality rate is per 1,000 people in the district.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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